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ABSTRACT
We consider an efficient two-party protocol for securely computing the similarity of strings w.r.t.
an extended edit distance measure. Here, two parties possessing strings x and y, respectively, want
to jointly compute an approximate value for EDM(x, y), the minimum number of edit operations
including substring moves needed to transform x into y, without revealing any private information.
Recently, the first secure two-party protocol for this was proposed, based on homomorphic encryption,
but this approach is not suitable for long strings due to its high communication and round complexities.
In this paper, we propose an improved algorithm that significantly reduces the round complexity
without sacrificing its cryptographic strength. We examine the performance of our algorithm for DNA
sequences compared to previous one.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As the number of strings containing personal information has increased, privacy-preserving computation has become
more and more important. Secure computation based on public key encryption is one of the great achievements of
modern cryptography, as it enables untrusted parties to compute a function based on their private inputs while revealing
nothing but the result.
In addition, edit distance is a well-established metric for measuring the similarity or dissimilarity of two strings.
The rapid progress of gene sequencing technology has expanded the range of edit distance applications to include
personalized genomic medicine, disease diagnosis, and preventive treatment (for example, see [1]). A person’s genome
is, however, ultimately individual information that uniquely identifies its owner, so the parties involved should not share
their personal genomic data as plaintext.
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Table 1: Comparison of the communication and round complexities of secure EDM computation models. Here, N is
the total length of both parties’ input strings, n is the number of characteristic substrings determining the approximate
EDM, and m is the range of the rolling hash H(·) for the substrings satisfying m > n. “Naive” is the baseline method
that uses H(·) as the labeling function for the characteristic substrings. In this table, we omit the security parameter or
the unit cost of encryption and decryption because the models use a same key length (e.g., 256-bit).
Method Communication Round
Ours O(n lg n+m) O(1)
Naive O(m lgm) O(1)
sEDM [19] O(n lg n) O(lgN)
Thus, we consider a secure multi-party edit distance computation based on the public key encryption model. Here,
untrusted two parties generating their own public and private keys have strings x and y, respectively, and want to jointly
compute f(x, y) for a given metric f without revealing anything about their individual strings.
1.2 Related Work
Homomorphic encryption (HE) based on the public key encryption model is an emerging technique that is being used
for secure multi-party computation. The Paillier encryption system [20] possesses additive homomorphism, enabling
us to perform additive operations on two encrypted integers without decryption. This means that parties can jointly
compute the encrypted value E(x + y) directly based only on two encrypted integers E(x) and E(y). HE is also
probabilistic, i.e., an adversary can hardly predicts x given E(x), even if they can observe some number of (x′, E(x′))
pairs for any x′.
By taking advantage of these characteristics, researchers have proposed several HE-based privacy-preserving protocols
for computing the Levenshtein distance d(x, y). For example, Inan et al. [16] designed a three-party protocol where
two parties securely compute d(x, y) by enlisting the help of a reliable third party. Rane and Sun [21] then improved
this three-party protocol to develop the first two-party one.
In this paper, we focus on an interesting metric called the edit distance with moves (EDM), where we allow any substring
to be moved with unit cost in addition to the standard Levenshtein distance operations. Based on the EDM, we can find
a set of approximately maximal common substrings appearing in two strings, which can be used to detect plagiarism in
documents or long repeated segments in DNA sequences. As an example, consider two unambiguously similar strings
x = aNbN and y = bNaN , which can be transformed into each other by a single move. Whereas the exact EDM is
simply EDM(x, y) = 1, the Levenshtein distance has the undesirable value d(x, y) = 2N . The n-gram distance is
preferable to the Levenshtein’s in this case, but it requires huge time/space complexity depending on N .
Although computing EDM(x, y) is NP-hard [22], Cormode and Muthukrishnan [8] were able to find an almost linear-
time approximation algorithm for it. Many techniques have been proposed for computing the EDM; for example,
Ganczorz et al. [12] proposed a lightweight probabilistic algorithm. In these algorithms, each string x is transformed into
a characteristic vector vx consisting of nonnegative integers representing the frequencies of particular substrings of x.
For two strings x and y, we then have the approximate distance guaranteeing L1(vx, vy) = O(lg∗N lgN)EDM(x, y)
for N = |x|+ |y|.1 Since lg∗N increases extremely slowly2, we employ L1(vx, vy) as a reasonable approximation to
EDM(x, y).
Recently, Nakagawa et al. proposed the first secure two-party protocol for EDM (sEDM) [19] based on HE, but, their
algorithm suffers from a bottleneck during the step where the parties construct a shared labeling scheme. This motivated
us to improve the previous algorithm to make it easier to use in practice.
1.3 Our Contribution
The complexities of our algorithm and related ones are summarized in Table 1. Computing the approximate EDM
involves two phases: the shared labeling of characteristic substrings (Phase 1) and the L1-distance computation of
characteristic vectors (Phase 2). First, we outline those phases below. Let the parties have strings x and y, respectively.
In the offline case (i.e., there is no need for privacy-preserving communication), they construct the respective parsing
trees Tx and Ty by the bottom-up parsing called ESP [8] where the node labels must be consistent, i.e., two labels are
1In Appendix A of [10], the authors point out that there is a subtle flaw in the ESP algorithm [8] that achieves this O(lg∗N lgN)
bound. However, this flaw can be remedied by an alternative algorithm called HSP [10].
2lg∗N is the number of times the logarithm function lg must be iteratively applied to N until the result is at most 1.
2
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Figure 1: Example of approximate EDM computation for strings S and S′. Here, the ESP trees TS and TS′ are
constructed by applying a shared labeling scheme for all internal nodes. After constructing TS and TS′ , the corre-
sponding characteristic vectors vS and vS′ are computed offline. Finally, the exact EDM(S, S′) is approximated by
L1(vS , vS′) = 2.
equal if they correspond to the same substring. In such an ESP tree, a substring derived by an internal node is called a
characteristic substring. In a privacy-preserving model, the two parties should jointly compute such consistent labels
without revealing whether or not a characteristic substring is common to both of them (Phase 1). After computing all
the labels in Tx and Ty , they jointly compute the L1-distance of two characteristic vectors consisting the frequencies of
all labels in Tx and Ty (Phase 2).
As reported in [19], in terms of usefulness, a bottleneck exists in Phase 1. The task is to design a bijection f : X ∪Y →
{1, 2, . . . , n} where X and Y (|X ∪ Y | = n) are the sets of characteristic substrings for the parties, respectively. Since
X and Y are computable without communication, the goal is to jointly compute f(w) for any w ∈ X without revealing
whether or not w ∈ Y . Here, this problem is closely related to the private set operation (PSO) where parties possessing
their private sets want to obtain the results for several set operations, e.g., intersection or union. Applying the Bloom
filter [4] and HE techniques, various protocols for PSO have been proposed [3, 9, 18]. However, these protocols cannot
be directly applicable to our problem because these protocols require at least three parties for the security constrained.
Thus, we propose a novel secure two-party protocol for Phase 1.
As shown in Table 1, we eliminate the O(lgN) round complexity using the proposed method that can achieve O(1)
round complexity while maintaining the efficiency of communication complexity. Furthermore, we examine the
practical performance of our algorithm for real DNA sequences.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 EDM
Let Σ be a finite set of alphabet symbols and Σ∗ be its closure. Denote the set of all strings of the length N by ΣN and
the length of a string S by |S|. For simplicity, we also denote the cardinality of a set U by |U |. In addition, S[i] denotes
the i-th symbol of S and S[i..j] denotes the substring S[i]S[i+ 1] · · ·S[j].
Next, we define EDM(S, S′) as the length of the shortest sequence of edit operations that transforms S into S′, where
the permitted operations (each with unit cost) are inserting, deleting, or renaming one symbol at any position and moving
an arbitrary substring. Unfortunately, as Theorem 1 shows, computing EDM(S, S′) is NP-hard even if renaming
operations are not allowed [22], so we focus on an approximation algorithm for EDM, called ESP (Edit-Sensitive
Parsing) [8].
Theorem 1 (Shapira and Storer [22]) Determining EDM(x, y) is NP-hard even if only three unit-cost operations
namely inserting or deleting a character and moving a substring are allowed.
3
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To illustrate the ESP algorithm, we consider a string S ∈ Σ∗. First, S is deterministically partitioned into blocks as
S = s1s2 · · · sk such that 2 ≤ |si| ≤ 3. Here, we omit the details since partitions are determined based on S alone,
without communication. Next, a consistent label `(si) is assigned to each block si, where `(x) = `(y) if x = y. The
resulting string L = `(s1) · · · `(sk) is then processed recursively until |L| = 1. Finally, a parsing tree TS is obtained
for S, which can be used to approximate EDM(S, S′) by applying the following result.
Theorem 2 (Cormode and Muthukrishnan [8]) Let TS and TS′ be consistently labeled ESP trees for S, S′ ∈ Σ∗, and
let vS be the characteristic vector for S, where vS [k] is the frequency of label k in TS . Then,
1
2
EDM(S, S′) ≤ L1(vS , vS′) = O(lg∗N lgN)EDM(S, S′)
for L1(vS , vS′) =
k∑
i=1
|vS [i]− vS′ [i]|.
Figure 1 shows an example of applying consistent labeling to the trees TS and TS′ , together with the resulting
characteristic vectors. The strings S and S′ are partitioned offline, so the problem of preserving privacy reduces to
designing secure protocol for creating consistent labels and computing the L1-distance between the trees. In this study,
we propose a novel HE-based algorithm for the former problem.
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Here, we briefly review the framework of homomorphic encryption. Let (pk, sk) be a key pair for a public-key
encryption scheme, and let Epk(x) be the encrypted values of message x and Dsk(C) be the decrypted value of
ciphertext C, respectively. We say that the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic if we have the properties: (1)
There is an operation h+(·, ·) for Epk(x) and Epk(y) such that Dsk(h+(Epk(x), Epk(y))) = x+ y. (2) For any r, we
can compute the scalar multiplication such that Dsk(r · Epk(x)) = r · x.
An additive homomorphic encryption scheme allowing sufficient number of these operations is called an additive HE3.
Paillier’s encryption scheme [20] is the first secure additive HE, but we cannot evaluate many functions by only the
additive homomorphism and scalar multiplication.
On the other hand, the multiplication Dsk(h×(Epk(x), Epk(y))) = x · y is another important homomorphism. If we
allow both additive and multiplicative homomorphism as well as scalar multiplication (called a fully homomorphic
encryption, FHE [13] for short), it follows that we can perform any arithmetic operation on ciphertexts. For example, if
we can use sufficiently number of additive operations and a single multiplicative operation over ciphertexts, we obtain
the inner-product of two encrypted vectors.
However, there is a tradeoff between the available homomorphic operations and their computational cost. To avoid
this difficulty, we focus on the Leveled HE (LHE) where the number of homomorphic multiplications is restricted
beforehand. In particular, two-level HE (Additive HE that allows a single homomorphic multiplication) has attracted a
great deal of attention. BGN encryption system is the first two-level HE invented by Boneh et al. [5] assuming a single
multiplication and sufficient numbers of additions. Using the BGN, we can securely evaluate formulas in disjunctive
normal form (DNF). After this pioneering study, many practical two-level HE protocols have been proposed [2,7,11,15].
For the EDM computation, Nakagawa et al. [19] introduced an algorithm for computing the EDM based on two-level
HE, but their algorithm is very slow for large strings. So, we propose another novel secure computation of EDM for
large strings based on the faster two-level HE proposed by Attrapadung et al. [2]. As far as we know, there are no secure
two-party protocols for the EDM computation that only use additive homomorphic property. Whether we can compute
EDM on a two-party protocol based on additive HE only is an interesting question.
3 Two-Party Secure Consistent Labeling
3.1 Hash Function
In our protocol, two parties, A (Alice) and B (Bob), agree to use a shared hash function to assign tentative labels to
their ESP trees. First, we consider the conditions that a hash function should satisfy. One desirable property of any hash
function used for our algorithm is that its hash value should be uniformly distributed, and we assume this is true in this
paper. In addition, the function involves a parameter m that represents the number of possible hash values, and this
affects our algorithm’s computational complexity, as well as the hash function’s conflict resistance and one-wayness.
3In general, the number of applicable operations over ciphertexts is bounded by the size of (pk, sk).
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Computational complexity. In our algorithm, A encrypts m individual bits and sends the resulting m ciphertexts to
B, who then adds or multiplies pairs of ciphertexts. Thus, our first requirement is that m be small enough for
these computation to be performed efficiently.
Conflict resistance. The hash function’s conflict resistance affects the accuracy of the edit distance estimated by
Algorithm 1. We say that a conflict occurs when two distinct texts happen to be hashed to the same value. Very
roughly, if conflicts occur with probability p, the average proportional error in the edit distances is also O(p).
That said, we can create conditions where the probability of conflict is below some threshold p, as follows.
Let n denote the number of labels (hash values) computed by the algorithm. To avoid conflicts, n must be
sufficiently small relative to m. After computing n hash values at random, we can estimate the probability of
at least one conflict having occurred as follows.
Pr[Conflicts] = 1− Pr[No conflict]
= 1−
(
1− 1
m
)(
1− 2
m
)
· · ·
(
1− n− 1
m
)
≈ 1− exp
(
− n
2
2m
)
.
Thus, to ensure this probability is below a given (small) threshold p, we require
n ≤ − ln (1− p)
√
2m. (1)
One-wayness. One-wayness is important for security. For example, if A happens to have two texts with hash values
h and h + 2, respectively, but does not have a text with hash value h + 1, then A would know that B has
a text with hash value h + 1. If the hash function is not one-way, A could then guess the next. A function
is theoretically one-way if it is computationally difficult to find an x such that H(x) = y given y with
non-negligible probability. Given an ideal hash oracle that selects H(x) uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m}
for any x, the probability of any guess x′ being correct for an unknown x is exactly 1m . Thus, to ensure the
function is effectively one-way, m must be sufficiently large.
It is known that, if the problem of finding a pair of distinct inputs that hash to the same value is computationally
intractable (strong conflict-resistance), the hash function is also one-way. For cryptographic hash algorithms, such as,
MD5 and SHA-1, strong conflict-resistance is required and the conflict probability must be negligibly small, such as
less than 12100 . This indeed requires that m be very large (2
128 and 2160 for MD5 and SHA-1, respectively), so it would
be computationally unfeasible to use a cryptographic hash function in our algorithm.
Nevertheless, if we relax the requirements somewhat, it is not difficult in practice to select an m that meets our needs.
For example, if n = 100 and p = 0.05, then m = 1, 900, 416 satisfies inequality (1). Generating and transmitting so
many ciphertexts would be time-consuming but still feasible, and would reduce the probability of breaking one-wayness
to a very low value.
We should, however, note that these requirements on m are merely necessary conditions for conflict resistance and
one-wayness. Even under these conditions, using a well-designed hash algorithm is still crucial.
The rolling hash algorithm [17], defined as follows based on two parameters m and b, is expected to be sufficiently
conflict-resistant and one-way. For a given input x = (s1, . . . , s`) ∈ [0, b)`, the hash function is given by H(x) =∑`
i=1 si · b`−i mod m. This algorithm has the useful advantage that we can compute H(xy) from H(x) and H(y) in
constant time, independent of the lengths of x and y.
3.2 Algorithm
Two parties A and B have strings SA and SB, respectively. First, they compute the corresponding ESP trees TA and TB
offline, using the rolling hash function to generate (tentative) consistent labels, thereby defining a setX ⊆ {0, 1, . . . ,m}
of n different labels in TA and TB with a fixed m. The algorithm’s goal is to securely relabel X using by a bijection:
X → {1, 2, . . . , n}, as described in Algorithm 1, where A and B have their own public and private keys.
In our algorithm, we assume a FHE (LHE) system supporting both additive and multiplicative operations. Since these
operations are usually implemented by AND (·) and XOR (⊕) logic gates (e.g. [6]), we introduce several notations
using such gates as follows. First, EA(x) denotes the ciphertext generated by encrypting plaintext x with A’s public
key, and EA(x, y, z) is an abbreviation for the vector (EA(x), EA(y), EA(z)). Here, EA(x, y, z) ·EA(a, b, c) denotes
(EA(x · a), EA(y · b), EA(z · c)) and EA(x, y, z)⊕EA(a, b, c) denotes (EA(x⊕ a), EA(y⊕ b), EA(z⊕ c)) for each
bits x, y, z, a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Using these notations, we describe the proposed protocol in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 for consistently labeling TA and TB
Preprocessing (tentative labeling): PartiesA and B agree to use a shared hash function H with a range {0, . . . ,m},
where m is chosen so as to meet the requirements given in Section 3.1. Both parties compute the ESP trees TA and
TB corresponding to their respective strings offline, then assign labels H(w) to all the nodes in their trees based on
their computed blocks w. Now, parties A and B have tentative label sets [TA], [TB] ⊆ {0, . . . ,m}, respectively.
Goal: Change all the labels using a bijection: [TA] ∪ [TB] → {1, . . . , n} without either party having to reveal
anything about their private strings.
Notations: EA(x) denotes the ciphertext of a message x encrypted by a two-level HE with A’s public key.
Sharing a dictionary:
Step 1: Party A computes the bit vector X[1..m] such that X[`] = 1 iff ` ∈ [TA]. Similarly, party B computes
Y[1..m] such that Y[`] = 1 iff ` ∈ [TB].
Step 2: A sends EA(X) to B and B sends EB(Y) to A.
Step 3: B computes (EA(X)⊕ EA(Y)) ⊕ (EA(X) · EA(Y)) = EA(X ∪ Y) and A computes
(EB(X)⊕ EB(Y))⊕ (EB(X) · EB(Y)) = EB(X ∪Y).
Relabeling [TA] using EA(X ∪Y) ([TB] is relabeling in the symmetrical way)
Step 4: A computes EB(L`) = EB
(∑`
i=1
(X ∪Y)[i]
)
for all ` ∈ [TA].
Step 5: A sends all EB(L` + r`) to B choosing r` uniformly at random from N.
Step 6: B decrypts all L` + r` and sends them back to A.
Step 7: A recreates L` ∈ {1, . . . , n} for all ` ∈ [TA] by subtracting r`.
Next, we define our protocol’s security based on a model where we assume that both parties are semi-honest, i.e.,
corrupted parties merely cooperate to gather information out of the protocol, but do not deviate from the protocol
specification. The security is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Semi-honest security [14]) A protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries if each party’s ob-
servation of the protocol can be simulated using only the input they hold and the output that they receive from the
protocol.
Intuitively, this definition tells us that a corrupted party is unable to learn any extra information that cannot be derived
from the input and output explicitly (For details, see [14]). Under this assumption, since the algorithm is symmetric
with respect to A and B, the following theorem proves our algorithm’s security against semi-honest adversaries.
Theorem 3 Let [TA] be the set of labels appearing in TA. The only knowledge that a semi-honest A can gain by
executing Algorithm 1 is the distribution of the labels {L` | ` ∈ [TA]} over [1, . . . , n].
Proof 1 First, the preprocessing phase givesA no new information, since it is conducted offline. Second, the dictionary
sharing phase does not provide any new knowledge either, since all the information that A receives from B is encrypted
using B’s public key. Third, when A is relabeling [TA], they only receive L` for ` ∈ [TA]. Finally, when B is relabeling
[TB], A knows L` + r` for ` ∈ [TB], but the r` are secret random numbers that B has generated uniformly at random,
and A cannot know their values. Hence, the L` + r` are distributed uniformly at random from A’s perspective. 
Although A can guess n as being either max{L` | ` ∈ [TA]} or a value just above this, and can obtain knowledge
about B’s labels by investigating {1, . . . , n} \ {L` | ` ∈ [TA]}, since we have assumed that the hash function is
(probabilistically) one-way, this does not give A any knowledge about B’s text.
Theorem 4 Algorithm 1 assigns consistent labels using the injection: [TA] ∪ [TB]→ {1, 2, . . . , n} without revealing
the parties’ private information. Its round and communication complexities are O(1) and O(α(n lg n + m + rn)),
respectively, where n = |[TA]∪[TB]|,m is the modulus of the rolling hash used for preprocessing, r = max{r1, . . . , rn}
is the security parameter, and α is the cost of executing a single encryption, decryption, or homomorphic operation.
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Table 2: Execution time (seconds) comparison for Phase 1, showing the preprocessing and relabeling time per label for
the number n of characteristic substrings to be relabeled. Here, “Preprocessing” denotes the time required to construct
the shared dictionary and “Relabeling (per label)” denotes the time needed to change a single label using the dictionary.
n sEDM [19] Ours
100 9.772 3.147
Preprocessing 1000 76.996 31.150
10000 725.463 304.314
100000 7264.354 3030.031
100 13.977 0.010
Relabeling (per label) 1000 160.995 0.047
10000 1066.259 0.319
100000 NA (> 10000) 2.124
Table 3: Execution time (seconds) of approximated EDM computation for Escherichia coli (100MB). Here, n is the
number of characteristic substrings used for EDM and the same rolling hash in Table 2 is used for each n. L1-distance
is computed by the sEDM [19].
Detail of EDM computation n time
100 4.055
Relabeling by our algorithm (Phase 1) 1000 63.597
10000 2506.431
100 4.097
L1-distance computation by sEDM [19] (Phase 2) 1000 4.135
10000 4.689
Proof 2 A two-level HE scheme allows sufficient number of additions and a single multiplication of encrypted integers.
Thus, we can securely represent the set [TA] ∪ [TB] by EA(X ∪Y) = (EA(X)⊕ EA(Y))⊕ (EA(X) · EA(Y)), and
assign consistent labels L` = rank1(`,X∪Y) for all ` ∈ [TA]∪ [TB]. Thus, the parties can securely obtain consistent
labels, with the security level depending on the encryption strength. Regarding the communication complexity, the
plaintexts sent have size of m bits (Step2) and n lg n bits (Step5), from which we can immediately derive the complexity
using the other parameters. The round complexity is evident. 
4 Experimental Results
Finally, we compared the practical performance of our algorithm with that of sEDM [19]. Both algorithms were
implemented in C++ based on the two-level HE [2] and library available from GitHub4, and compiled using Apple
LLVM version 8.0.0 (clang-800.0.42.1) under MacOS Mojave 10.14.5. The algorithm’s performance was evaluated on
a system with a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM.
Table 2 shows the results for generating n ∈ {100, 1000, 10000, 100000} different labels shared by the par-
ties. The key length of encryption is fixed to 256 bits. Our algorithm uses the rolling hash modulo p ∈
{1031, 10313, 103123, 1031347} for each n, respectively. This shows the running times for each n, where “Pre-
processing” gives the time t1 required to construct the shared dictionary and “Relabeling (per label)” gives the response
time t2 needed to change a single label. Thus, the total time for each algorithm is t1 +nt2 for each n. Note that the total
time is mainly occupied by the relabeling time for both algorithms. Therefore, these results confirm that our algorithm’s
computation was significantly lower than that of sEDM in all cases.
Table 3 shows the total time of approximate EDM computation for real DNA sequence available from Pizza&Chili
Corpus5. From this corpus, we use Escherichia coli, known as highly repetitive string where 110MB original string
is compressed to 5MB by 7-zip6. This means that the number of characteristic substrings is relatively smaller, so the
restriction of the examined n up to 10000 is reasonable. However, in reality, we cannot execute the sEDM [19] even for
these repetitive strings due to the cost of relabeling shown in Table 2. By the results in Table 2 and 3, we confirm the
efficiency of our algorithm for large-scale data.
4 https://github.com/herumi/mcl
5http://pizzachili.dcc.uchile.cl
6https://www.7-zip.org/
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an improvement to a previously proposed HE-based secure two-party protocol for
computing approximate EDM. The problem we tackled is reduced to jointly assigning minimum consistent labels
from X ∪ Y ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} to {1, 2, . . . , n}. The fact that recent two-level HE systems allow sufficient number of
additions and a single multiplication over ciphertexts enabled us to significantly improve the execution time. From a
cryptographic point of view, m should be sufficiently large (i.e., we assume that X ∪ Y is sparse) so that it is difficult
for Alice to learn about Bob’s labels from the distribution of ones in his label vector. In contrast, m should be smaller
for saving the communication cost. We plan to investigate this problem further in future work.
To the best of our knowledge, existing two-party protocols for consistent labeling need both additive and multiplicative
homomorphic operations over the ciphertexts. Since an HE system that only involves additive operations is computa-
tionally less taxing, whether or not we can solve the relabeling problem by only exploiting additive homomorphism is
an important practical question.
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